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DECISION THEORY AND BABBITT V. SWEET HOME: SKEPTICISM 
ABOUT NORMS, DISCRETION, AND THE VIRTUES OF 
PURPOSIVISM 
VICTORIA F. NOURSE* 
ABSTRACT 
In this writing, I apply a “decision theory” of statutory interpretation, 
elaborated recently in the Yale Law Journal, to Professor William Eskridge’s 
illustrative case, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great 
Oregon.1 In the course of this application, I take issue with the conventional 
wisdom that purposivism, as a method of statutory interpretation, is inevitably 
a more virtuous model of statutory interpretation. First, I question whether we 
have a clear enough jurisprudential picture both of judicial discretion and legal 
as opposed to political normativity. Second, I argue that, under decision theory, 
Sweet Home is a far easier case than either Justice Stevens’s or Justice Scalia’s 
opinions reveal. Finally, I critique both opinions for failing to rely on norms 
borrowed from Congress’s actual decisions in the 1982 Endangered Species 
Act Amendments. The question then, is not “norms or not,” but whose norms, 
Congress’s or the courts’, should apply. 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor Eskridge has given us an extraordinarily erudite lecture on 
legisprudence. The notion of the normative “toggle” is an important way of 
understanding the struggle between the positivist and normative impulses in 
statutory interpretation and in particular within legal process theory. In this 
brief writing, I aim to tell a somewhat different jurisprudential and legislative 
story, one not so much focused on the past, but on what I believe lies in the 
future of statutory interpretation. Applying rule-based decision theory, I argue 
that both Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia misunderstood Congress’s 
 
* Professor Victoria F. Nourse, Georgetown Law School; Executive Director, Center on 
Congressional Studies at Georgetown Law. My special thanks to the students who organized the 
conference, to Professor Joel Goldstein who invited Professor Eskridge to give the prestigious 
Childress Lecture, and to the other panelists: Jim Brudney, Karen Petroski, Ted Ruger, Scott 
Shapiro, and Doug Williams. 
 1. 515 U.S. 687, 688, 708, 714 (1995). Justice Stevens wrote for the Court, with Justice 
Scalia in vigorous dissent. Justice O’Connor concurred. 
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decisionmaking process, turning what might have been an easier case into a 
harder one. At a more theoretical level, I question whether the notion of 
normativity itself is under-theorized in the legal literature, and whether it is an 
inevitable virtue of purposivist analysis. 
I begin by considering some of the broader jurisprudential issues raised by 
Professor Eskridge’s account,2 arguing that normative discretion should not be 
confused, as it sometimes is, with out-and-out judicial legislating. After all, 
norms come in many varieties, some legal, and others borrowed from religion, 
cooking, sport and even beekeeping. The question of discretion and 
normativity itself deserves greater academic attention and articulation. In my 
own view, norms are institutionally sustained; they are how institutions 
“think.” More work must be done to articulate the norms belonging to the 
judiciary, and those more characteristic of a legislature. 
In Part II, I interpret Sweet Home’s statute differently from either Justice 
Stevens or Justice Scalia, based on what I have elsewhere dubbed a “decision 
theory” of statutory interpretation (to distinguish it both from textualist and 
purposivist approaches).3 Decision theory does not view Congress as an 
institution with a mystical or unified “intent,” but as one which reaches 
decisions over time through a sequential, institutionalized process, later 
decisions trumping earlier ones. Decision theory begins with text but, to ensure 
that this textualist reading does not simply “pick and choose” text, decision 
theory advocates a “second opinion”—confirmatory legislative history.4 
Because this search looks for congressional decisions, it reverse-engineers 
legislative history focusing on the materials necessary to understand 
Congress’s textual decision. In this case, I argue that Justice Stevens was right 
but that both opinions could have been a good deal simpler. I also lay out a 
case based on four to six pages of legislative history that strongly confirms my 
textual reading and Justice Stevens’s result. 
In Part III, I question the claim that purposivism is necessarily virtuous 
because it forces judges to be candid about norms. It has been the general 
academic and jurisprudential wisdom that the Hart & Sacks purposivist 
formula is inevitably preferable for this reason.5 If judges believe it inevitable 
 
 2. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Nino’s Nightmare: Legal Process Theory as a 
Jurisprudence of Toggling Between Facts and Norms, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 865, 870–71 (2013) 
(“. . . I shall now argue that the positivist judge in the hard cases finds it natural to invest statutory 
meaning with her or his interpretation of the moral or normative context of the statute, and then to 
justify such judgments based upon conventional sources.”). 
 3. Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by 
the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 75 (2012) [hereinafter Nourse, Decision Theory]. 
 4. Adrian Vermeule, Second Opinions and Institutional Design, 97 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1435 
(2011). 
 5. As Professor Einer Elhauge has explained: “The dominant answer given in modern 
American law schools is that when the legal materials fail to specify the statutory meaning, you 
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that they apply their own normative visions, then judges may lose sight of the 
one constant in the field of statutory interpretation—deference to Congress. 
One need not deny that hard cases exist. Nor, however, should one deny the 
risk of moral hazard, that searching for norms and purposes will make judges 
believe that they are Hercules (Ronald Dworkin’s fictional judge)6 and entitled 
to impose their views on a public powerless (short of impeachment) to oust 
them. At the margin (or perhaps even at the core), candor may turn out to be an 
excuse for laziness, contempt for democratic institutions, and judicial 
arrogance. 
To illustrate this, I argue that it was not necessary for Justice Stevens or 
Justice Scalia to invoke the normative visions Professor Eskridge finds in the 
opinions. In fact, both of the normative visions he identifies are quite 
problematic compared to the congressional norms contained in the Endangered 
Species Act Amendments of 1982’s text and legislative history. Rather than 
concentrating on the 1973 Endangered Species Act, Justice Stevens would 
have been far better off invoking Congress’s 1982 normative “balancing act” 
between industry and environmentalists, one documented in the 1982 
legislative history. Justice Scalia’s normative vision fares less well, having 
almost no relationship to Congress’s actual 1982 decision. Indeed, Justice 
Scalia’s “takings” norm is based on a common but pervasive mistake about the 
history of property rights, a normative vision that finds little support in the 
1982 Act’s text or legislative history. Both opinions would have been better off 
had they stuck closer to Congress’s decisions and Congress’s norms. 
I.  JUDGES ARE NOT LEGISLATORS 
Last month I was asked to write a response to a lecture given by Judge 
Posner at Duquesne University in which he openly declared that as a judge, in 
hard cases, he was a legislator.7 This is the gist of the so-called Hartian move 
described by Eskridge—that there are gaps in the law, and judges, like 
legislators, fill in that gap.8 With all due respect, I disagree, albeit not because I 
believe that there are no gaps. I say this because I believe most lawyers, and 
most law professors, have very little idea about what it is to be a legislator. As 
Jeremy Waldron once put it: “We think we know how legislators argue; but do 
we really?”9 I have known some legislators in my life, and I have participated 
 
as judge have no choice but to exercise your own normative judgment about which statutory 
interpretations would be best . . . .” EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO 
INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 3 (2008). 
 6. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105 (1978). 
 7. Richard Posner, Judicial Opinions and Appellate Advocacy in Federal Courts—One 
Judge’s Views, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 3, 4–5 (2013). 
 8. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 272 (2d ed. 1994). 
 9. JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 25 (1999). 
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in the collective action we know as legislating, although this is rare for a law 
professor.10 Based on all I know from that experience, there is a very, very 
large divide between the institution we know as Congress and the institution 
we know as the judiciary, and the roles we properly ascribe to those 
institutions. 
Let us start with pragmatics and institutional structure. A judge is a 
relatively passive actor who must decide a case or controversy that comes to 
him without any action on his or her part. He cannot stand up and close 
Guantanamo or eradicate the Department of Education. I have given to telling 
my students that to argue that a judge is a legislator confuses a mouse-like 
jurisdiction with an elephantine one. Judges do not decide to go to war; they do 
not decide the budget. When they do make decisions that even appear of this 
scope, as in Bush v. Gore,11 they are roundly criticized.12 The very notion that 
such a case was a gross deviation from standard judicial operating procedure 
implies that the average case of legal decisionmaking is supposed to be a 
banal, depoliticized affair. 
“Legislating” in the sense I will define it is not “interstitial lawmaking.”13 
Equating the two commits the fallacy of the mouse and the elephant. Today, it 
is believed by many that, in the 1930s and earlier, some academics dubbed 
“realists” proclaimed that there was very little difference between law and 
politics.14 Even jurisprudes who are resolutely positivist, sticking to the letter 
of the law, acknowledge that in hard cases judges must fill gaps.15 Modern 
positivists aimed to cabin skepticism about law’s autonomy by moving politics 
to the margins, the interstices.16 In my view, there is a distinct line between 
 
 10. Dakota S. Rudesill, Closing the Legislative Experience Gap: How a Legislative Law 
Clerk Program Will Benefit the Legal Profession and Congress, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 699, 706 
(2010). 
 11. 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000). 
 12. RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 198–220 (2001) (recounting, but criticizing, the outcry of law 
professors regarding Bush v. Gore). 
 13. On filling gaps, see HART, supra note 8 (“If in such cases the judge is to reach a decision 
and is not, as Bentham once advocated, to disclaim jurisdiction or to refer the points not regulated 
by the existing law to the legislature to decide, he must exercise his discretion and make law for 
the case instead of merely applying already pre-existing settled law.” (emphasis in original)). 
 14. Andrew Altman, for example, writes that “the master theme of legal realism” was “that 
of the breakdown of any sharp distinction between law (adjudication) and politics.” Andrew 
Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 206 n.4 
(1986). In fact, as Brian Leiter has argued, this was not the theme actually adopted by legal 
realists themselves so much as a theme imposed upon them later by the critical legal studies 
movement. See Brian Leiter, In Praise of Realism (and Against “Nonsense” Jurisprudence), 100 
GEO. L.J. 865, 871–75 (2012). 
 15. See HART, supra note 8, at 272. 
 16. Id. at 273. 
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politics and law that is important to preserve: there is an identifiable difference 
between law and politics as institutions (or more particularly what lawyers do 
in cases and legislators do in legislating), and this difference applies even in 
hard cases of so-called “interstitial lawmaking.” Modern legal positivists have 
done little to alter that vision except to call politics “norms,” (which renders 
everything from sports to religion a form of politics) and then move 
normativity to the outskirts, rather than to the core of the legal project.17 
Not all normative claims are alike and not all normative claims are 
political claims. Some norms are based in law and some norms are grounded in 
baseball or music or religion. Only at the extremes, when a judge clearly goes 
outside the bounds of legal normativity—takes a poll, consults matters outside 
the record, relies upon matters demonstrably false, cites the wrong cases—can 
we say that the judge has “gone political.” Then it is proper to criticize the 
judge for legislating. This does not mean that we cannot, as I do below, 
criticize the norms used by courts; norms may be deeply contested within law, 
as Sweet Home and many other cases reflect. It does mean that to say that law 
is normative is not to say that it is inherently “political” in any meaningful 
sense, but that judges can in fact act in ways that violate the norms of their 
institution by following “political norms.” 
The Constitution defines a legislator as a representative.18 We must take 
this word literally. To be a representative is to “re-present.” The Senator or 
Representative must stand in the shoes of others—voters. Now sometimes this 
is viewed in crass terms and other times it is viewed in idealistic ones. In crass 
terms, it means to pander; in idealistic ones, to sound the clarion call of the 
public good. But, in both cases, the member is standing in for someone else, 
namely lay citizens. Legislative normativity is tied to representation: a 
proposition is normatively correct if it is a proper re-presentation of others’ 
views. A correct normative position within the legislature is one that satisfies 
some or all of the public, whether that normative position is legal, moral, 
arbitrary, or incoherent. Put in other terms, I am suggesting that different kinds 
of institutions have norms, and the legislature has a very different measure of 
the propriety of its norms than do courts. 
If this is our most basic definition of a legislator, then judges are not 
legislators. They have no constituents and their normativity is not to be based 
on the degree to which it agrees with non-experts in the public, in groups small 
or large. Judges do not take polls; they do not consult their party leaders. That, 
of course, is the point of their job and of the isolation imposed upon them by 
the Constitution. They are not supposed to act for their buddies in the law firm 
or their former prosecutor friends or their political party. Indeed, the very 
 
 17. See id. at 271–75. 
 18. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1–3; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
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structure of appellate panels makes it unlikely that, even if they wanted to act 
in such a way, it would be routinely successful in changing results.19 
Having said this about the normativity of the legislator, let me also say that 
Professor Eskridge is surely correct that judges often decide based on 
normative visions. But it does not follow that normativity entails judicial 
activism, natural law or legislating. Yes, both judges and legislators have 
norms and values, but these are inarticulate terms: norms and values are shared 
by priests and umpires and political pundits. Institutions determine the 
rationality and legitimacy of norms. As Mary Douglas and others have shown, 
normativity is institutional, and because it is institutional, it follows from the 
radically different institutional natures of legislatures and courts that their 
visions of normativity will differ.20 At the very least, these are the kinds of 
questions—questions about the nature of normativity—that jurisprudential 
experts must take more seriously. With the exception of Jeremy Waldron,21 
however, the standard jurisprudential debates in law reviews are almost 
entirely unwilling to grapple with the institutional and normative differences 
between courts and legislatures.22 
Thus, it is not normativity per se but particular forms of normativity that 
should distinguish legislating from judging. When politicians legislate they are 
entitled to rely upon entirely selfish norms (“Iowa supports corn subsidies”) 
and entirely arbitrary norms (“please exempt Oklahoma from this law because 
I need to be reelected”). It is not the job of judges to impose “selfish norms”—
norms that only they themselves (or their friends) accept. They must appeal to 
 
 19. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 
837–41 (2008) (identifying “panel effects” that moderate the influence of politics since democrat 
and republican appointees on panels must agree). 
 20. MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK 4 (1986); see also W. Richard Scott, 
Institutional Theory: Contributing to a Theoretical Research Program, in GREAT MINDS IN 
MANAGEMENT: THE PROCESS OF THEORY DEVELOPMENT 460, 464–65 (Ken G. Smith & Michael 
A. Hitt eds., 2004). 
 21. See WALDRON, supra note 9, at 25 (overtly asking questions that indicate distinctions 
between normative and institutional differences by shedding light on the gap between the 
institutional process of creating law and the weight that law carries). 
 22. See generally Victoria F. Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, 
the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119 (2011) 
[hereinafter Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress] (arguing for a “public meaning” theory of 
statutory interpretation based on a representational concept of the separation of powers in place of 
various strict textualist approaches); see also Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, 54 
MD. L. REV. 633, 644 (1995) (“My point then is not that legislatures are suffering from overall 
academic neglect, but that, in jurisprudence at any rate, we have not bothered to develop any 
idealistic or normative picture of legislation. Our silence here is deafening compared to our 
philosophical loquacity on the subject of courts. There is nothing about legislatures or legislation 
in modern philosophical jurisprudence remotely comparable to the discussion of decision-making 
by judges.”). 
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norms that have some basis in a more general law, even if that law is contested. 
No one would have thought it an appropriate normative claim in Sweet Home, 
for example, for Justice Scalia to write that he liked ranchers better than 
environmentalists. This violates the basic meta-norms of the judicial 
institution. In this sense, both Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens were not 
legislating simply by invoking norms; the question is whether their norms 
departed so far from standard legal reasoning that we can confidently say that 
they have crossed the line toward invoking the kind of norms considered 
legitimate in the political sphere, but not in the legal sphere. One measure of 
that, in the field of statutory interpretation, is the degree to which judges 
attempt to understand and remain faithful agents of Congress. 
II.  SWEET HOME’S STATUTORY CLOSET 
Professor Eskridge has emphasized that norms were closeted in the 
opinions of both Justice Stevens and Scalia. In fact, norms were sometimes 
quite open;23 what was really closeted was the relevant statute—the 
Endangered Species Act of 1982.24 Let us briefly recap the progression of 
legislative events. The 1973 Endangered Species Act barred the “taking” of 
any endangered species and defined “take” to include a variety of actions 
including “harm” to a species.25 In 1975, the Secretary of the Interior issued a 
regulation governing significant habitat modification as a form of statutory 
“harm.”26 In 1978, the Supreme Court decided a highly controversial case, 
TVA v. Hill, involving habitat modification: whether the snaildarter could stop 
a dam—and the court ruled in favor of the fish’s habitat and against the dam.27 
In 1982, after “heated debates”28 between environmental interest groups and 
industry, Congress finally came to a bipartisan compromise, aiming to resolve 
 
 23. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714–15 (1995) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia’s opinion, for example, opens with the obviously normative 
claim that the majority’s ruling “imposes unfairness to the point of financial ruin.” 
 24. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411 (1982) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006)). 
 25. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1); id. § 1532(19). Section 9(a)(1) of the Act provided that it was 
“unlawful for any person” to take any such species within the United States, and § 14 defined 
“take” as follows: “The term ‘take’ means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, 
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.” Id. § 1532(14). 
 26. 50 CFR pt. 17.3 (1994) (as quoted in Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 691). “The Secretary has 
promulgated a regulation that defines the statute’s prohibition on takings to include ‘significant 
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife.’” Id. at 690. 
 27. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172–73 (1978). 
 28. 128 CONG. REC. 26,189, 26,187 (1982) (calling legislation “explosive”) (statement of 
Rep. John B. Breaux) (statement made upon passage of Conference Report text). 
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the conflicts the statute had created and to simplify and streamline its 
operation.29 
A. The Proper Text 
As I have written elsewhere, there is no more mistaken notion in the field 
of statutory interpretation than that the term “history” in the phrase “legislative 
history” should be taken literally.30 Congress makes decisions moving forward, 
not backward. It decides at Time One and may change that decision entirely at 
Time Two. To understand what happened at Time Two it is not always 
necessary to start at Time One; in fact, it may distort Congress’s ultimate 
decision by suggesting a coherent and causal narrative that does not exist. 
Congresses change with the political winds; members are entirely warranted in 
violating all sorts of logical propositions favored by lawyers. Decision theory 
thus posits that the most important decisions in a sequential congressional 
process are the last decisions.31 In this case, that means that the judicial focus 
should have been on the 1982 Act. Instead, the Stevens and Scalia opinions in 
Sweet Home rely to a large degree on the purposes and meanings of the 1973 
statute. 
Before we go any further, let us remember that we are talking about real 
time. Think about the difference between 1973 and 1982 for a moment. Ten 
years in House-of-Representatives-time is five (count ‘em five) election 
cycles.32 The 1973 Act was passed during the height of the Watergate scandal; 
the 1982 amendments two years after President Reagan was elected. As the 
ranking House minority member on the bill stated in considering the 1982 law, 
“We have come a long way since the Endangered Species Act of 1973.”33 And, 
in fact, the country had changed quite considerably. A President had resigned 
in disgrace, the Vietnam War had generated active public resistance, and a 
conservative revolution had been launched. If nothing else, real life history and 
common sense34 should tell us that legislative decisions taken in 1982 need not 
have much to do with those taken in 1973. 
The central question for decision theory is the meaning of the 1982 statute, 
a text considered but not featured in either the majority or dissenting 
 
 29. Id. at 26,187–89 (statement of Rep. Walter Jones). 
 30. See Nourse, Decision Theory, supra note 3, at 98 (discussing this misconception). 
 31. Id. at 110. 
 32. The House appears to have taken the lead on these issues. See supra notes 28–29 and 
infra notes 76–77. 
 33. 128 CONG. REC. 26,188 (statement of Rep. Norman Lent) (on passage of the Conference 
Report in the House). 
 34. On the role of common sense in statutory interpretation, see generally Richard D. 
Cudahy, Steer Clear of the Twilight Zone and Apply Common Sense: A Few Thoughts on 
Statutory Interpretation, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 997 (2013). 
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opinions.35 In the 1982 statute, Congress authorized permits for actions 
otherwise violating the “take” provision, “if such taking is incidental to, and 
not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.”36 Justice 
Stevens noted this provision after extended discussion of the 1973 law, 
offering it a supporting, rather than a starring, role.37 Justice Scalia, too, left the 
1982 text to the end of his textual discussion, as if it were something of an 
afterthought, preferring to focus on the text of the original 1973 Act and its 
prohibition of “takings.”38 Both opinions failed to spotlight the most relevant 
statutory text. 
The 1982 text provides permits for private actors who incidentally take 
species.39 The text contemplates a vision of “take” broad enough to include 
non-intentional harm, which in turn is reasonable enough to support the 
Secretary’s regulation on significant habitat modification (the Secretary’s 
interpretation need not be the only one, only a “reasonable” one under standard 
rules of deference to agencies).40 Once “take” includes non-intentional harm, 
Justice Scalia’s emphasis on intentional takings of individual animals faces a 
seemingly insuperable obstacle—it renders superfluous the 1982 “incidental” 
takings provision. As the majority opinion explains: “[R]espondents would 
read ‘harm’ so narrowly that the permit procedure would have little more than 
[an] absurd purpose.”41 Put in other words, Justice Scalia’s view would cover 
the burning of a forest for the express purpose of eradicating the spotted owl—
a rather unlikely event if one really wants to do away with a vanishing species 
and one in which the owl-obsessed predator is hardly likely to stop to take out 
a permit. 
The 1982 statutory text, not to mention the 1973 text, supports this reading. 
The very notion of “endangering” a species implies a definition of harm that 
fits poorly with Justice Scalia’s preference for “intentional takings.”42 The 
dictionary tells us that danger includes a state of vulnerability or a risk of 
harm.43 As Justice Stevens noted in a footnote, to intentionally take “any 
 
 35. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698–700, 
704–705 (1995) (mentioning the 1973 law and its central purpose); id. at 700–01, 707–08 
(referencing the 1982 statute); id. at 726–29 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the 1973 law in 
attempts to rebut the majority’s reliance on it); id. at 729–31 (discussing the 1982 statute and 
similarly rejecting its applicability to the majority’s analysis). 
 36. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1982). 
 37. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 707. 
 38. Id. at 729–31 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 39. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). 
 40. 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.3; Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
845 (1984). 
 41. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700–01. 
 42. Id. at 717–22 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 43. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 460 (4th ed. 2000). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
918 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:909 
[endangered] species” would be “a formidable task for even the most rapacious 
feudal lord.”44 
Moreover, in 1982, “habitat modification” was hardly a new idea, going all 
the way back to the very first 1966 endangered species protection law.45 In 
1978, Congress had amended the law to require that the Secretary define 
“critical habitat” when designating an endangered species.46 In 1982, Congress 
returned to the definition of critical habitat—a central part of the 1982 bill: 16 
U.S.C. § 1533 was amended to require that the Secretary, when listing a 
species as endangered, “designate any habitat of such species which is then 
considered to be critical habitat.”47 A statute so focused on “critical habitat” is 
unlikely to have assumed that individual harm to animals was the sole focus of 
the Act. 
Critics will reply that the Secretary wrote the regulation in 1975, before the 
1982 Act. This is no answer because 1982 provides the best evidence of 
Congress’s most recent decisionmaking process. When Congress ratifies 
meanings supporting a regulation, it would be silly and wasteful to strike the 
regulation just so that the agency could reissue the very same regulation under 
the later-enacted law.48 Just imagine if the majority struck down the 
Secretary’s habitat regulation, only to have the Secretary reenact it, based on 
the 1982 law. This would waste both judicial and agency resources. 
Critics will also insist, as did Justice Scalia, that critical habitat was to be 
saved by a land acquisition program, not by the takings provision.49 This too 
focuses on the wrong statute. Justice Scalia relies upon some 1973 legislative 
 
 44. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 698 n.10. 
 45. S. REP. NO. 97-418, at 1 (1982) (“[D]evelopment of the current ESA programs to 
conserve endangered and threatened species can be traced back to 1966. . . . [T]he 1966 Act . . . 
authorized the acquisition of endangered species habitat.”). 
 46. Id. at 3 (“Congress also amended the 1973 Act to require the designation of critical 
habitat as part of the listing process.”). 
 47. H.R. REP. NO. 97-835, at 2 (reporting the text decided on by the 1982 conference and 
passed later by both houses); S. REP. NO. 97-418, at 4 (1982) (“The 1978 amendments to the ESA 
required the designation of critical habitat as part of the listing process.”). This 1982 conference 
report states that, after 1978, these provisions had “failed on two grounds. First, it is not being 
designated. Second, it has improperly delayed listings.” Id. As a result, the 1982 Act was an 
attempt to rectify these process deficiencies in habitat designations. H.R. REP. NO. 97-835, at 3 
(amending 16 U.S.C. § 1533 to require that the Secretary address in a timely fashion various 
claims or revisions about “habitat designation”); id. at 5 (requiring that the Secretary issue a 
designation of “critical habitat” when the final regulation is issued concerning “endangered” 
status, and providing time limits for the extension of time to determine “critical habitat.”). 
 48. Justice Scalia argues that the statute was not reenacted and therefore should not ratify the 
Secretary’s interpretation, presumably meaning that Congress did not reenact the “takings” 
provision. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 729 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This misunderstands 
congressional process. Once the definition in an Act is created, that definition remains the law; 
unlike authorizations of money, there is no need to “repass” definitional provisions. 
 49. Id. at 727. 
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history50 for the proposition that there was a sharp division between provisions 
aimed at addressing habitat problems—to be rectified by acquiring critical 
habitat—and provisions aimed at “taking” individual animals.51 The legislative 
history cited is not terribly persuasive as it occurs prior to the final Act 
language even in 1973.52 In fact, the same page of debate provides contrary 
evidence: Senator Tunney explains that the 1973 Act covers “harmful” actions 
to species which presumably explains the statutory term “harm” and its 
addition.53 But whatever one thinks about the 1973 Act, the text of the statute 
enacted in 1982 reflects no such strong distinction. As Justice Stevens made 
clear, there is no evidence that Congress in 1982 had decided that the habitat 
acquisition provision would be an exclusive, rather than an additional, 
remedy.54 
All of this suggests that Justice Stevens might well have written a shorter 
and more pointedly textualist opinion than he did. It also explains why Justice 
Scalia is at pains to avoid the 1982 text. There is some irony in this, of course, 
as Justice Scalia is considered the Supreme Court’s high textualist. As 
Professor Eskridge rightly notes, Justice Scalia’s opinion is interesting 
precisely because it appears to be a highly textualist opinion making all sorts of 
claims about how his intentional “taking” version explains the structure of the 
1973 statute. In fact, it departs quite overtly from standard textualist premises 
by invoking in its very first paragraph a striking normative vision of the law 
conscripting the lonely farmer into environmental war: with characteristic 
verve, Justice Scalia opens his opinion asserting that the law “imposes 
unfairness to the point of financial ruin—not just upon the rich, but upon the 
simplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to national zoological use.”55 
As a good lawyer, I appreciate a slippery slope argument, and as a voter I 
might have voted for it. But, in this case, the textualist irony is compounded: 
textualists typically reject this particular form of argument. The “simplest 
farmer” rhetoric implies that the statute can reach absurd limits. Typically, 
 
 50. Id. (citing 119 CONG. REC. 25,669 (1973)). Justice Scalia also argues that the “takings” 
provision originally included language relating to habitat that was struck in committee. Id. Given 
that this occurs months if not years before the relevant final text, this textual move is not in fact a 
“smoking gun,” see Eskridge, supra note 2, at 879, but rather a smoking irrelevancy. See also 
Nourse, Decision Theory, supra note 3, at 115. 
 51. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 727–29 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 52. The statements cited are made in July 1973. 119 CONG. REC. pt. 20. 
 53. In the same 1973 floor speech by Senator John Tunney cited by Justice Scalia as 
evidence for a sharp distinction between acquisition programs and the taking provision, Senator 
Tunney explains that the statute was aimed at preventing actions “harmful” to species, a statement 
that supports the later, noncontroversial addition of “harm” to the statute in 1973, as well as the 
Secretary’s regulation. 119 CONG. REC. 25,669. 
 54. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 706, 707 n.19 (majority opinion). 
 55. Id. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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textualists are wary of deploying the absurdity canon56 precisely because it is 
the “mother” of all consequentialist canons57—it is a version of purposivism in 
canon guise. Whether or not we want to lump Justice Scalia in with Professor 
Dworkin (the original odd couple) as a jurisprudential matter,58 Professor 
Eskridge is surely right that the Sweet Home dissenting opinion is decidedly 
Janus-faced, with one foot in the textualist camp and the other in the not-so-
closeted purposivist camp. 
B. A Second Opinion: A Brief Legislative History 
Decision theory begins but does not end with text, because it recognizes 
that judges may “pick and choose” texts, and that textual ambiguity is 
“structurally-induced.”59 One should never begin with the assumption that a 
statute’s meaning will be plain from its text.60 Given such worries, it seems 
only sensible that one would want to “check” or “confirm” a “textual” choice 
by looking at any available evidence supporting or detracting from that 
choice—in short, the legislative history.61 Let us also assume, per decision 
theory, that we reverse-engineer Congress’s decision. The best legislative 
history is the last legislative history, the legislative history nearest the text—
here, the legislative history immediately preceding the enactment of the 1982 
Act. That means the best history is the 1982 conference report text, the 
conference report’s joint explanation,62 and later debate in each House on the 
conference report. 
The conference report’s joint explanation explains that private habitat 
modification was covered by the 1982 Act as the central example of an 
“incidental” taking63 (the term “habitat” was used over fifty times in a thirty-
five page report64). In discussing the “incidental takings” provision of the 1982 
 
 56. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2390–91 (2003). 
 57. Jane S. Schacter, Text or Consequences?, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1007, 1011 (2011). 
 58. See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 901–07 (urging that Justice Scalia becomes a 
Dworkinian). 
 59. Nourse, Decision Theory, supra note 3, at 137 (“Just as legislative history is subject to 
‘picking and choosing,’ so too is text.”); Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress, supra note 22, at 
1128–34. 
 60. See Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress, supra note 22, at 1119. 
 61. See Vermeule, supra note 4, at 1435–72. I have used professor Vermeule’s work here in 
a way he might find inconsistent with his own view of statutory interpretation. See generally 
ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION (2006) (arguing for deference to administrative agencies, not courts). 
 62. For those unfamiliar with congressional procedure, a conference report first reports the 
text on which the conference has agreed; the “joint explanation” is the explanation, and hence the 
legislative history associated with the conference. 
 63. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(C)(i). 
 64. Using Find function for “habitat” as applied to H.R. REP. NO. 97-835 (1982) (Conf. 
Rep.). 
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bill, the specific example used was private habitat modification.65 The joint 
explanation of the conference report explains: 
This [incidental takings] provision is modeled after a habitat conservation plan 
that has been developed by three Northern California cities, the County of San 
Mateo, and private landowners and developers to provide for the conservation 
of the habitat of three endangered species and other unlisted species of concern 
within the San Bruno Mountain area of San Mateo County.66 
The committee explanation continues: 
This provision will measurably reduce conflicts under the Act and will provide 
the institutional framework to permit cooperation between the public and 
private sectors in the interest of endangered species and habitat conservation. 
The terms of this provision require a unique partnership between the public 
and private sectors in the interest of species and habitat conservation. 
However, it is recognized that significant development projects often take 
many years to complete and permit applicants may need long-term permits.67 
In discussing the need for permits as long as thirty years to protect industry 
reliance, the conference committee joint explanation continues: “The 
Secretary, in determining whether to issue a long-term permit to carry out a 
conservation plan should consider the extent to which the conservation plan is 
likely to enhance the habitat of the listed species or increase the long-term 
survivability of the species or its ecosystem.”68 The committee then went on to 
dub the San Bruno project involving endangered butterflies as a model for 
“incidental takings” involving habitat degradation: 
Because the San Bruno Mountain plan is the model for this long term permit 
and because the adequacy of similar conservation plans should be measured 
against the San Bruno plan, the Committee believes that the elements of this 
plan should be clearly understood. Large portions of the habitat on San Bruno 
Mountain are privately owned . . . . 
1. The Conservation Plan addresses the habitat throughout the area and 
preserves sufficient habitat to allow for enhancement of the survival of the 
species. The plan protects in perpetuity at least 87 percent of the habitat of the 
listed butterflies; 
2. The establishment of a funding program which will provide permanent on-
going funding for important habitat management and enhancement activities. 
Funding is to be provided through direct interim payments from landowners 
 
 65. This legislative history directly contradicts Justice Scalia’s claim that the statute’s 
takings provision only applied to “public” lands. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. 
for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 728–29 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 66. H.R. REP. NO. 97-835, at 30–31 (1982) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added). 
 67. Id. at 31 (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. (emphasis added). 
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and developers and through permanent assessments on development units 
within the area; 
3. The establishment of a permanent institutional structure to insure uniform 
protection and conservation of the habitat throughout the area despite the 
division of the habitat by the overlapping jurisdiction of various governmental 
agencies and the complex pattern of private and public ownership of the 
habitat.69 
I do not think the legislative history could be shorter or clearer. Lest these 
two pages of legislative history not convince, however, one need only go one 
step further to cement this understanding of Congress’s 1982 decision. In the 
brief three-page debate in which the House considers and passes the 
conference report (so much for voluminous legislative history),70 we find 
habitat problems center stage. The House Sponsor, Representative Breaux, in 
his opening remarks about the controversies surrounding the original 1973 Act, 
made specific reference to the TVA v. Hill habitat case, noting that “visions of 
snail darters haunted us.”71 Representative Jones, a republican, echoed the 
sentiment: “There is probably no one here today who has not heard of the snail 
darter—the little fish that fought a dam all the way to the Supreme Court and 
won—temporarily.”72 If there was no one on the House floor who did not 
know of the snail darter, it is impossible that there was no one who did not 
know that the case involved habitat modification. 
If there remains doubt about whether the 1982 law applied to private 
entities, consider Representative Breaux’s statements referring to the San 
Mateo development project on the day in on which the conference report 
passed the House: 
The second major House initiative that was accepted [by the Conference] 
involved permits for the taking of endangered species when no other Federal 
action is involved. We found that, in many instances, the development of long 
range conservation plans that allowed some taking of a species could be more 
beneficial to that species than simply leaving it alone. A prime illustration of 
this involves a planned development in San Mateo County that could affect 
two species of butterflies. The developer and the Fish and Wildlife Service 
have developed a long range plan, to be funded by the developer, that will 
provide for management of the habitat of the butterflies. Without the plan, 
exotic species of plants would crowd out the plants essential to the butterflies 
and they would be severely threatened. Our legislation would encourage the 
 
 69. Id. at 31–32 (emphasis added). 
 70. 128 CONG. REC. 26,187–89. 
 71. Id. at 26,187. 
 72. Id. at 26,189. 
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development of similar conservation and allow the long-range planning 
necessary to provide both species protection and investment security.73 
We are now up to a massive five pages of legislative history. Earlier 
debates and earlier reports could be cited, as Justice Stevens did, but the 
conference report and statements by the House drafters are the best legislative 
history about the decisions made in 1982 about a House-authored provision. 
This analysis confirms Congress’s bipartisan choice to read the text to cover 
harms that were not intentionally inflicted but “incidental” to a taking such as 
habitat modification. 
Certainly, reasonable minds may reject this policy judgment. The policy 
may even look unconstitutional,74 but it is difficult to say that this was not 
Congress’s decision. As far as one can tell, Congress was quite happy to leave 
the problems of potential over-enforcement to the agency, even if that meant 
granting it power wide indeed. The incidental “taking” provision of the 1982 
Act simply makes no sense if it is impossible to take endangered species 
without intention. The legislative history is a “second opinion” confirming that 
reading. 
III.  CANDOR OR SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY: THE PROBLEM WITH NORMS 
AND PURPOSES 
What then of the proposition asserted by Professor Eskridge that it is more 
candid to invoke a statute’s purpose because this will “flush out” hidden 
norms? In fact, as Professor Eskridge’s own exposition suggests, whether open 
or closeted, normative positions are quite evident in both Sweet Home 
opinions. The question remains whether purposivism is more virtuous because 
it allows the open play of norms. To the extent that this is a relative claim—
that relative to textualism, purposivism is more likely to reveal normative 
preferences, this may be true: hiding norms in judgments of “plain meaning” 
does seem to hide the ball. But it does not follow that there are no risks to 
opening the field to find a statute’s “purpose.” We must consider the risk that 
modern purposivists have invited the very phenomenon they fear: decisions 
based on idiosyncratic, or what I have called “selfish,” norms. 
Consider Justice Stevens’s praise of the 1973 Act’s single-minded pursuit 
of environmentalism. Professor Eskridge argues that Justice Stevens is 
affirming the “green revolution.” Professor Eskridge writes that the majority 
opinion reflected “the ‘green property’ norm, the modern regulatory notion that 
landowners have, since 1970, been on notice that they cannot impose costs on 
 
 73. Id. at 26,188. 
 74. Robert F. Blomquist, Witches’ Brew: Some Synoptical Reflections on the Supreme 
Court’s Dangerous Substance Discourse, 1790–1998, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 297, 322 (1999) 
(suggesting the scope of laws like the one at issue do not allow for such an encompassing 
reading). 
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the environment without expecting regulatory pushback.”75 The problem is that 
this norm may seriously misjudge what happened ten years later in 1982. In 
1982, as the House and Senate debate on the conference report reveals, 
Congress was well apprised of the need to balance the needs of industry and 
environmental groups, the costs of environmental extremism, and the 
protection of animals (and genetic material) threatened with extinction. 
Precisely because of the norms invoked by Justice Scalia, and the modern 
property rights revolution endorsed by President Reagan, it was difficult to 
reauthorize the 1973 law.76 Cost and industry concerns were all over the 1982 
debate.77 The Congress that decided to grant permits for incidental takings was 
virtually terrified of the snail darter and cautioned the Secretary that there were 
potentially extreme applications of the Act which should be avoided in private 
and public land cases.78 The 1982 statute itself provided that the Secretary 
“shall designate critical habitat . . . after taking into consideration the economic 
impact, and any other relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as 
critical habitat.”79 
Surely, Justice Stevens would have sounded a more conciliatory tone, and 
one more based in actual congressional decisionmaking, had he relied not on 
the “green revolution” alone, but also on Congress’s attempt to “balance” the 
green revolution with industrial costs. This was all the more important, of 
course, because of Justice Scalia’s insistence on the potential “financial ruin” 
of the Act.80 Certainly, this was a powerful argument against Justice Scalia’s 
 
 75. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 882; see PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE 
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 134–35 (1993); J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 
CONST. COMMENT. 239, 242 (1990); Terry W. Frazier, The Green Alternative to Classical 
Liberal Property Theory, 20 VT. L. REV. 299, 347–71 (1995); David B. Hunter, An Ecological 
Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial Protection of the Public’s Interest in 
Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 311–13 (1988). 
 76. 128 CONG. REC. 26,189 (statement of Rep. Walter Jones) (“Earlier efforts to reauthorize 
this act caused heated debates in Congress . . . and between business and environmental 
interests.”). Representative John Breaux was the manager of the bill in the House and one of its 
principal authors. Id. at 26,187–88 (statement of Rep. Gene Snyder) (the ranking minority 
member concurred that the bill was “fair and rational” to “both industry and the environmental 
community.”). 
 77. See, e.g., id. at 26,188 (statement of Rep. John B. Breaux) (pointing to the span of 
interest groups with a hand in the legislation’s outcome, including “organizations as diverse as 
Greenpeace, the Audubon Society, the National Wildlife Federation, the Western Regional 
Council, the Edison Institute, and the American Mining Congress . . .”); id. at 26,189 (statement 
of Rep. Thomas Evans) (highlighting the occasional “irreconcilable conflict” between 
environmental and economic interests). 
 78. See infra text accompanying note 71; see also 128 CONG. REC. 26,188–89. 
 79. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–304, § 2(b)(2), 96 Stat. 
1411, 1412 (1982). 
 80. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714–15 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
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claim that the statute included no coverage of private habitat degradation 
because in 1973, the legislative history relegated that to government purchase 
of land to preserve habitat.81 By 1982, it was clear that Congress not only had a 
different idea of the statute, but so did lots of groups and interests that cared 
about property rights, and Congress was attempting to accommodate them.82 
If Justice Stevens’s normative vision is insufficiently attentive to 
Congress’s decisions, so too is Justice Scalia’s. Professor Eskridge argues, 
The baseline for Justice Scalia’s dissent is the political and moral philosophy 
of Sir William Blackstone, updated to understand the sagebrush rebellion of 
the 1990s, namely, the reaction by western ranchers and farmers to what they 
considered excessive federal interference with their control over their own 
property. A natural law thinker who viewed the law in moral, liberty-loving 
terms, Blackstone also provided a synthesis of the common law of the 
eighteenth century, which assured well-nigh absolute protection for 
landowners to do anything with their property that did not tangibly harm other 
landowners. In the last generation, the sagebrush/property rights social 
movement objected that environmental regulations violated this Blackstonian 
norm. President Ronald Reagan (1981–89), who appointed Justice Scalia to the 
Court and elevated Justice Rehnquist (a second Sweet Home dissenter) to Chief 
Justice, endorsed the property rights social movement during his term in office 
and, consistent with the views of its leaders, supported the movement’s notion 
that excessive environmental regulation was not only inefficient and anti-
libertarian, but amounted to a “taking” of private property.83 
There are all sorts of reasons to suggest that Blackstonian norms, if that is 
what Justice Scalia was invoking, are not the kind of norms that “faithful 
agents” of a twentieth century Congress would or should employ. There is no 
reason to believe that legislators still legislate with the common law in mind, 
as they might have in the eighteenth century. To impose common law norms 
on a modern Congress is far more radical a notion than is generally thought. 
Blackstone affirmed all sorts of ancient common law practices, like beating 
one’s wife,84 practices that no modern legislature would tolerate precisely 
because norms have changed, and changed noncontroversially. As Judge 
Posner has expressed it: textualism is the “lineal descendant of the canon that 
 
 81. Id. at 726–29. 
 82. See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Envtl. Pollution of the S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works on S. 2309, 97th Cong. 10 (1982) 
(statement of Sen. G. Ray Arnett); Endangered Species Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Merch. Marine and 
Fisheries, 97th Cong. 2 (1982) (statement of Rep. John B. Breaux); Endangered Species Act 
Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Envtl. Pollution of the S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. 
Works, 97th Cong. 3–4 (1981) (statement of Sen. Robert A. Jantzen). 
 83. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 880. 
 84. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *444–45. 
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statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed, and, like 
that canon, was used in nineteenth-century England to emasculate” 
Parliament’s modernizing legislation.85 
The historical truth is that the norms expressed by Professor Eskridge and 
attributed to Justice Scalia are in fact modern ones, a 1980s vision of property 
rights, spurred on by Richard Epstein’s book Takings, not a vision of property 
rights that can be found in the constitutional law of 1890 or 1910 or 1920.86 If 
Justice Scalia believes that he is invoking the Blackstonian vision of takings 
and property, this was not the vision of takings prevalent in the Supreme Court 
throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth century, considered the hey-day of 
property rights. By 1930, the Supreme Court had upheld all sorts of property 
regulations, including zoning, on the theory that the regulation was based on a 
harm to other property.87 So, for example, in 1928, if your cedar trees were 
diseased, they could be “taken” without compensation if they posed a danger to 
other cedar trees.88 If in 1928 Congress was entitled to believe that the 
Supreme Court would not see such an action as a constitutional violation of 
property rights, they were entitled to see this in the same way, over fifty years 
later. 
If both of these points are correct, then on the scale of proper judicial 
normativity, Justice Scalia’s opinion is far more “legislative,” I would suggest, 
than Justice Stevens’s opinion (to be clear, elsewhere I have criticized Justice 
Stevens for his opinions).89 Frankly, Justice Scalia would have been far more 
candid if he were to have suggested that the statute was unconstitutional under 
Professor Epstein’s “modern” theory of property rights,90 than embedding that 
assumption within his reading of the text of the statute (and the legislative 
history). I agree, for example, that the lost history of those rights has created a 
paradox: property rights are far less protected than they should be because 
liberals do not think they exist at all,91 and conservatives on the bench do not 
 
 85. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 
U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 821 (1983). 
 86. Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due 
Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 761–67 (2009). 
 87. Id. at 764; Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 392–95 (1926) 
(rationalizing the upholding of zoning laws for a variety of safety and harm prevention purposes). 
 88. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277–79 (1928). 
 89. Nourse, Decision Theory, supra note 3, at 100. 
 90. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: HOW TO REVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY 8–11 (2008); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE 
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 306 (1985). 
 91. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 470–89 (2005) (Justices Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer—all notoriously left-leaning justices—as well as Justice Kennedy, were in 
the majority in finding that a government taking was not in violation of the Fifth Amendment 
takings clause); see also Steven Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 
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know the history of property regulation detailed above.92 The question remains 
whether being candid about these norms is enough. As we can see from this 
critique, candor does not necessarily entail historical accuracy. 
One might go so far as to say that, in a world where normativism 
(Professor Eskridge’s term) is normal, where gaps are considered fair play for 
judicial norms, then it seems quite clear that one will arrive at opinions like 
that of Justice Scalia, which openly brandish norms. Although seemingly an 
“odd couple,” upon reflection there is in fact nothing terribly surprising about 
the fact that Justice Scalia’s opinions may have a tendency to “morph” in 
academic eyes into those of Ronald Dworkin’s Hercules.93 This is not only 
because the legal process school, by emphasizing norms, has invited judges to 
engage in such behavior. It is also because the legal process school was a legal 
process of courts, not Congress.94 If judges and lawyers are taught little about 
congressional decisionmaking, they will of course ignore it, filling gaps and 
choosing texts within the context of meanings that are decidedly judicial and 
entirely unwilling to address Congress’s meanings. It is no surprise that in such 
a world, Justice Scalia would hold tight to the term “taking” as if it had all 
sorts of meanings with which constitutionalists associate it, when the far more 
likely explanation is that congressional drafters, particularly those in the 
Senate, took it from modern state law. 
The deeper problem here is not textualism’s embedded normativity (its 
tendency to embed norms in textual choice), but that it is based on 
jurisprudential foundations that amount to a radical invitation to ignore 
Congress entirely. It is no accident that Justice Scalia has based his version of 
textualism on the jurisprudential foundations of Max Radin, arch-realist and 
radical of the 1930s. Invoking Radin, Justice Scalia has argued that there is no 
such thing as congressional “intent,” and therefore it is proper to look only at 
text.95 This decontextualizing move invites the play of norms, for it means that 
in cases of ambiguity (every case, by definition, which reaches the Supreme 
Court), the judge will choose a particular chunk of the text, with no check on 
whether that is the right chunk of text, and then will proceed to ignore 
Congress’s context and procedure. This is why Judge Posner has taken to 
 
UCLA L. REV. 1103, 1162 (1983) (discussing the rejection of the property rights freedom model 
by most ethical liberals based on the overriding concern for a common good). 
 92. But see DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 13 (2011) (an example of a scholar who does know the 
history of property regulation in the United States). 
 93. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 889. 
 94. See generally Nourse, Decision Theory, supra note 3. 
 95. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
31–32 (1997). 
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calling textualism an “autistic” theory of statutory interpretation—because it 
tends to decontextualize text from any form of human communication.96 
I would simply add that there is not only a risk that it is autistic, but that it 
is autocratic, for it refuses to engage with the legislative context in which 
decisions are made. There is no “check” on the autistic, decontextualizing 
move which fixates on a particular text and then proceeds to use that text to 
make a normative point that may or may not be embedded in that text. As I 
have shown elsewhere, the decontextualizing move is itself subject to choice—
why one piece of text rather than another?97 Why “take” rather than 
“incidentally take,” “take” rather than “harrass,” “take” rather then “endanger,” 
“take” rather than “critical habitat,” et cetera? Without context, there is no 
possibility for restraining the possible choices among texts except by reference 
to other information about Congress’s decisionmaking process. As most 
linguists would explain, decontextualized language may in fact be subject to a 
vast range of meanings. If I say, “go there,” do I mean go by plane or car or 
train; do I mean go to China or New Jersey or France?98 
If there is a shocking conclusion here is it not that the dissenting opinion 
uses norms, but that it is the opinion of a legal realist, where by legal realism I 
mean that, like Judge Posner (with whom he wars about statutory 
interpretation), at the end of the day, Justice Scalia appears willing to accept 
that it is fine to act as a legislator. It is fine to ignore Congress and embrace the 
common law, the place where judges are most powerful,99 even if this amounts 
to a “selfish norm,” one which refuses to check that judgment against 
Congress’s decisionmaking process. The only difference is that Judge Posner is 
candid about his “legislative” duties and Justice Scalia wraps them in positivist 
garb. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, let me briefly set forth what I think may be some questions 
that need to be asked about jurisprudence and statutory interpretation. First, is 
it possible to define a form of legal normativity that is different and identifiable 
from political normativity? In my view, normativity itself needs to be a subject 
of jurisprudential inquiry. Second, is it possible that purposivism invites judges 
to make easier cases harder precisely by emphasizing that there are gaps in the 
law? In my view, this possibility cannot be ruled out if there are cases, such as 
 
 96. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 194 (2008). 
 97. Nourse, Decision Theory, supra note 3, at 137 (showing that judges may “pick and 
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 98. ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A 
LAWYER” 45–49 (2007). 
 99. POSNER, supra note 96, at 153 (“Common law systems give judges the power to make 
law. This makes them more powerful than civil law judges, and power augments independence.”). 
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Sweet Home, that might have been made easier in ways I have discussed. 
Third, and finally, if I am right about decision theory, is it possible that there is 
an alternative to textualism and purposivism, which is both a challenge to 
standard legal process theory, and yet adds to it by emphasizing not the legal 
process of courts, but the legal process of Congress? 
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